Migration Crisis in Europe: Problem or gift?

I wear many hats, but call me a neo-Marxist on this one. Humanitarian, geo-political or socio-economic problem, or is it a panacea to Europe’s demographic challenge? The migration crisis witnessed in Europe in the recent months is one unprecedented and unforeseen by many population and migration theorists across the globe, mainly due to their focus on the labor market and limited attention to forced migration. Let’s look at 2 broad schools of thought: the population enthusiasts including Marxists and Neo-Marxists on one hand; and the advocates of population control such as Thomas Malthus. The latter category often carries the connotation of inhumane pessimism. While Malthusians argue that warfare and famine are positive checks to population growth, libertarians, socialists and Marxists have maintained that T. Malthus did not consider humanitarian concerns or socio-economic advancements in his 1798 Essay on the Principal of Population. The new world order pays great attention to humanistic values and any Country opposed both to the neoclassical paradigm and to the modernization school which underpins the mobility transition model of Wilbur Zelinsky is seen as promoting Malthusian-ism. Hungary has found itself in this spot with fellow EU Countries accusing her of perpetuating a humanitarian crisis by refusing to allow migrants on transit through its borders. Denmark on the other hand was initially reluctant to allow migrants on transit to Sweden from Germany through its borders but has now recanted its decision, allowing in migrants after thorough checks in line with the Schengen code on immigration, which Denmark, the UK and Ireland are non-signatories.

Where do migrants originate? The crisis in the Middle East including Syria, Iraq and Lebanon is one that has caused significant suffering among large masses dominantly women and children. The current migration crisis is caused by mass movement and forced mobility due to the war in Syria. Alarmists would rightfully say the war in Iraq and Syria is a potential trigger for world war 3 considering the interest and involvement of Russia, Iran, Australia, the US and the EU. But these are not the only migrants into Europe. Political upheaval in Africa and South Asia has equally caused a major re-shape in migration in Europe and weighty concerns among EU governments. In early 2015 alone, UNHCR estimates that 137,000 refugees and migrants crossed the Mediterranean travelling in life threatening conditions; in mid-April, 800 people died in the waters in one of the largest refugee ship-wrecks fleeing war and conflict at home. Of all migrants and refugees arriving in Europe by sea, 34% were Syrians, the single largest nationality. Many refugees flee to neighboring countries such as Turkey and Lebanon. However, the economies and infrastructure of many neighboring refugee-hosting countries are weakening, making it difficult for refugees to find work, shelter, health care, and education. Humanitarian funding has equally declined, hence many migrants simply move on to more economically friendly and welcoming Countries like Sweden and Germany. Migrants have in past weeks moved en masse from Syria to the EU through Turkey, Greece, Hungary and Denmark into Germany and Sweden. The question remains why refugees are unwilling to move to neighboring Gulf Nations.

According to UNHCR, majority of migrants are Arab (78%), Sunni (87%) men (83%), between the age of 18-35 (71%), productive youth. 40% are university educated, and another 46% have secondary education. Around half (45%) are married, and 44% have children. Obviously, if not well managed and integrated into host societies, these young people remain a threat and a time-bomb to host countries. Germany and Sweden have taken up majority (about 45%) of all refugees. Some say this is not sustainable; indeed not a good sign at all for neo-Marxists and pro-dependency-theory demographers who maintain that migration is self-perpetuating, reproducing inequality through the mechanism of cumulative causation. Let’s have a look at Germany and Sweden’s demographic profile.

In 2014, Sweden’s TFR was 1.88, slightly below what we demographers call replacement fertility, meaning couples only have adequate children to replace themselves. Over time, birth and death rates have fallen, particularly in the 2000s, while immigration has increased, upholding steady population growth. Birth rates are higher among immigrants (majority Asian origin) than ethnic Swedes. This means that over time, Sweden will have a larger population of Asian Swedes than ethnic Swedes. Sweden’s economy is highly industrialized implying that they need skilled labor which in recent years has declined as a result of demographic change. So it’s easier to import cheap labor from Asia to build this economy, especially productive youth. While this is in harmony with the dual labor market theory, positive for demographic dividend enthusiasts, and is in accordance with proposition 4 of Wilbur Zelinsky’s mobility transition theory, Neo-Marxists and native politicians may not be as excited considering immigration as part of the global geographic division of labor and of the historical process of subordinate incorporation of the underdeveloped world into the major capitalist economies, regardless of whether migration is forced or voluntary. However, none of these theories put into consideration modern conflict and a surge in forced migration. Germany’s TFR on the other hand was 1.43 in 2014; way below replacement fertility and its population pyramid represents the classic demographic transition model. Germany therefore needs a large population of immigrants to sustain its labor market. Locals take up mostly skilled labor, leaving unskilled labor to immigrants in line with the segmented labor market theory. It's no surprise that Germany has allowed almost 800,000 refugees into the country in the past year.

So what with all these theories and models? While Germany and Sweden are in need of both skilled and unskilled labor to sustain their economies, the combination of low TFRs, low but increasing death rates due to rising prevalence of NCDs and high immigration implies that immigrants are likely to take up a larger proportion of the population over time. This may result in a destabilized social equilibrium, leading to tensions and eventual conflict. The probability of easy transfer of terrorism abroad is equally higher in the wake of forced migration. Serendipitously, Sweden and Germany’s demographic dilemma are likely to be solved through a stable population growth and a more stable labor market. However, to realize the positive effects of this mass immigration, host countries must lay emphasis on proper integration of immigrants.

Spare us the bloodshed

So here's what's happening in Burundi. President Pierre Nkurunziza is seeking a 3rd term in an upcoming election, but a significant population in his country do not agree; so they've opted to protest. Bujumbura, the disorganized city on the shores of lake Tanganyika is now a war zone and could get worse. A brief history would tell you where the situation is heading. Nkurunziza, a University lecturer, son of a Tutsi mother and a Hutu father, escaped death in 1995 when Tutsi-dominated army attacked and killed 200. His father had been killed in 1972 in a different civil war. His 5 siblings were all killed in war.

After the escape he joined the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) rose over the ranks and was appointed president in 2005 unanimously by parliament following a peace agreement signed in Arusha. He managed to bring on board the FNL, a Hutu rebel group to the peace table and formed an inclusive government (both Hutu, Tutsi, all gender). Then, many countrymen saw him as a unity leader given his multi-ethnic origin.

Over the years, Burundi's population has grown (10.2 million in 2013) with >50% aged 15-24 years. Now, given harsh economic times, thanks to conflict and politics, a youth wing of the ruling party was formed in 2010 (Nkurunziza's 2nd term), the Imbonerakure (the Kirundi word for “those that see far”). They conduct surveillance and intimidation on behalf of the state; unfortunately they've mutated to conduct acts like sexual harassment, extortion and theft. They are also Hutu-dominated. In the current political unrest, as recently as yesterday, they posted leaflets threatening to kill Tutsi's and have joined police (wearing full police gear with guns) shooting at protesters. Obviously they are protected by the state. Although Burundi's constitution allows for only 2 presidential terms, the Constitutional court of Burundi ruled in favor of Nkurunziza, arguing that his 1st term was a direct appointment by parliament and did not count as a constitutional term in office.

Unfortunately and far too often, political conflicts in Africa always degenerate into ethnic conflicts. Let's hope this is not another genocide in the making. AU as usual is silent until ICC comes knocking. This president has won many awards for his peace efforts over the years. Burundians hope he will act as the uniting factor he has always been and will be sensible enough to see the suffering of his people. He of all people knows the cost of war, having lost almost his entire family to fighting. Nkurunziza must act now and unite his people. Arusha 2005 agreement was too costly to throw to the dogs. Dialogue is the key!

Phillip- Peace and Conflict researcher

Taming Northern Kenya's conflict

Nadome, Kapedo, Lokori, Lomelo, Todonyang, Loiyangalani, Lorogon, Kainuk etc. Anyone who’s been to these villages would tell you how vast, rural, rudimentary and 15^th centrury-ish they are. Yet the most striking thing about these places is that they turn into war-zones often.

At 71598km², Turkana County is 103 times the size of Nairobi County with no significant development - no roads (seasonal rivers or laga have been converted into roads), few buildings if any. Divide the county amongst all the 41 million Kenyans and each one gets 2/5 of an acre, enough to put up a maisonette. That is how vast the county is! However, the population is 4 times less than that of Nairobi. Inhabitants are dominantly the Turkana community who don’t see eye to eye with the neighbouring Pokot to the South, the wild Ethiopian Merille (Daasanach) to the North, Karamojong to the West and Samburu to the South East. A common practice among all these communities is cattle rustling, often retaliatory.

But I’ll focus on the Pokot-Turkana conflict. Yester-years the raiders only collected cattle and goats and shot at anyone who stood in their way; but increased ethnic rivalry has made things worse. One of my visits to Kainuk, Turkana South is unforgettable. The Pokot gave notice to the Turkana of their intention to raid that night and for sure they came as we sought shelter in a GSU camp in Lorogon village. These fellows sweep every living thing they find with a bullet, just like Biblical times during Israel’s wars. A bullet is never wasted, must be on-target. A drive through Kapedo, Lomelo, Lokori, Ngamia 1 to Lokichar from Marigat sends chills as you meet armed curious young men firing bullets at birds and wild game. Occasional flash floods would prolong the 7 hour journey to 1 or 2 days.

Visitors or strangers must be careful as they can trigger instant shooting by Turkana/Pokot young men some barely in their teens who roam the jungles armed with AK 44 automatic rifles. Heheee…guns are toys here. The situation is the same in neighbouring West-Pokot, Samburu North/East/Central and East Pokot (Baringo). Thanks to the fluorine-filled Lake Turkana which separates Marsabit and Turkana Counties to the East, otherwise it could be another conflict zone. A complex mix of issues motivates the Northern Kenya conflict. Competition for resources driven by perennial drought, bad politics and ethnic rivalry. One other phenomenon, increasingly difficult to understand, and which has exacerbated the conflict, is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the region which has been driven by political shrewdness, regional wars and forced immigration from next-door warring countries.

So how do you expect the government to pacify these communities? First, the area is too vast for the few policemen we have. As at 2012, Kenya had just about 70 to 80,000 officers, 10,000 guard VIPs, 45,000 are APs assigned to County/District Offices, others are in prisons, leaving about 20,000 to do daily policing in the whole country, some of whom control traffic. You will need between 10 and 15,000 police, heavily armed (not with AK47s or G3 rifles) to contain wild fellows with automatic rifles. Second, raiders understand their terrain more than an ordinary Kiganjo-trained officer. Suguta valley, Baragoi, arguably the hottest place in the country is a good case study. Third, media reports indicate that political leaders finance raiders. Some of these cattle are stolen, slaughtered and packaged for sale to Nairobi and other towns. You probably had stolen beef for dinner last night. Fourth, poorly paid officers in this region sell bullets at as low as kes.200. Sad situation.

I do think there’s hope though. The Marakwet-Pokot conflict of the 80s and 90s came to an end. Even with a complex mix of culture, bad politics, SALW and competition for resources, the conflict ended, thanks to peace and dialogue meetings promoted by local political and religious leaders as well as the national government. Some would say Elgeyo-Marakwet is a tinier county than Turkana and Pokot, but I think conflict in the Turkana and Pokot region is concentrated at the border points and so is controllable despite the vastness. The national security organs have valuable lessons to learn from the process that ended the Marakwet-Pokot conflict. I think Gedion Moi’s drone technology should also work well in this area for surveillance. Phillip #NadomeIsKenya #Nadome